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ABSTRACT History provides plenty of examples of individual sectors reaching unsus-
tainable market capitalizations relative to the total value of the market. When these sector
weights fall back, it can be catastrophic for investors. Examples include energy in the
early 1980s, the post millennium tech bust and the recent crisis in the ﬁnancial sector.
Getting in and out of the right sectors at the right times is difﬁcult for several reasons,
including the nature of the economy and the limitations of models that rely on
macroeconomic variables as inputs. Previous studies suggest that putting a cap on
sector weightings allows investors to avoid the most serious damage from these ‘sector
corrections’. We ﬁnd support for this at the broad MSCI Global Industrial Classiﬁcation
Standard sector level using 20 years of data.
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SECTOR INVESTING AND THE
BUSINESS CYCLE
Business cycles, or the short-run
ﬂuctuations in aggregate economic activity
around a long-run growth path, do not
occur at regular or predictable intervals.
They are recurrent but not periodic (Zarnowitz,
1992), meaning the economy’s ebbs and
ﬂows do not resemble an orderly series
of repeatable patterns of similar magnitude
and duration. What are referred to as
cycles are really reactions to varied and
random shocks from a variety of sources,
including global (for example, China),
institutional (for example, regulatory),
endogenous (for example, technology) and
exogenous (for example, central bank policy)
shocks.
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This means that ‘Investing along the
business cycle’ requires the ability to forecast
these shocks ahead of time and to anticipate
sector performance accordingly. However,
the varied constellations of economic
conditions around these events make them
somewhat one time affairs, unlikely to repeat
themselves in ways similar enough to offer
guidance for investors. Even if they did, it can
be argued that markets learn and update
(rational expectations), which means that the
timing of performance among economic
sectors would vary from one cycle or shock to
the next. Perhaps that is why a recent
investment study by Stangl et al (2007) that
rotated sectors according to conventional
wisdom over the past 9 post-WWII cycles
found that, even with perfect hindsight,
investors would have realized at best marginal




Another approach to active sector investing
uses various macroeconomic variables like
exchange rates, interest rates and oil prices to
forecast sector returns or earnings directly.
Prices lead quantities is a key theme of many of
these models. That is, quantity data like
unemployment, GDP, consumer spending
and so on, has to be counted and therefore is
only available with a lag, making it
backward-looking or at best coincident.
Quantity data is also often based on
sampling, making it subject to frequently
large revisions, once more complete data
become available. Price data, on the other
hand, are forward-looking and have
forecasts embedded in them. Price variables
like interest rates and commodity prices are
determined by supply and demand. They
summarize the forward-looking
expectations of the often millions of market
participants who determine their
magnitude. That is why it is often asserted
that prices set in markets contain more
information about the future than any single
analyst could possess (Hayek, 1945).
Unfortunately, these ‘market-based’
models all suffer from what has been called
‘the signal extraction problem’. That is,
because market price variables are driven by
supply and demand factors, the same ‘signal’ –
like a rise in currency values – can have
entirely different investment implications
depending upon which inﬂuence, supply or
demand, is driving it.
For a simple example take interest rates,
which are determined by the supply and
demand for loanable funds. Economic
expansions usually result in an increase in the
demand for loanable funds, which puts
upward pressure on interest rates. On the
other hand a reduction in the supply of
loanable funds – perhaps because of central
bank tightening – will also put upward
pressure on interest rates. The demand-
driven interest rate rise in the ﬁrst case is
bullish for investors in general because it
reﬂects an expanding economy, while the
supply-driven interest rate rise is bearish
because it reﬂects less loan availability.
Quantitative time series models that use
interest rate movements as inputs will mix
these two very different types of signals
together, distorting the forecasting result
rather than improving it.
Another example would be the supply
shock-induced oil price increases of the
1970’s, which were bearish, versus the
global demand-driven price increases of the
2004–2008 period, which were bullish.
Trained economists miss this routinely. For
example, in August 2004 more than a third
of the 56 economists that made up the Wall
Street Journal’s forecasting survey felt that oil
in the US$50–$59 range could lead, in a
year’s time, to recession. This view was
revised a year later with 8 out of 10 believing
that it would take a rise to more than $80 a
barrel to bring on recession (Hilsenrath and
Annet, 2005). Of course, when recession did
occur in December 2007 the price of oil was
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over $90, and the recession was widely
attributed to the global ﬁnancial crisis, not
the price of oil, which plummeted as the
recession worsened. There was clearly little
comprehension at the time (though there is
now) of the importance of discerning
whether the higher oil price was demand
driven or supply driven.
PASSIVE SECTOR
APPROACHES
These hurdles to forecasting provide
considerable rational for the use of more
passive sector allocation strategies. Chief
among these is to just hold the current
market capitalization-based weights. The
argument here rests on a straightforward
assumption of efﬁcient markets: Any
weighting other than the market weight
reﬂects a bet against the market, suggesting
that the market is inefﬁcient or mispriced
(Jones, 2008).
Standing somewhat in contrast to this view
is the notion that markets do not price sectors
efﬁciently, at least in the short term. That is, at
any point in time some sectors are overvalued
and some are undervalued. This is somewhat
analogous to the case for over- or
underweighting individual securities. Holding
all sectors at current market weights would
thus mean overweighting the overvalued
sectors and underweighting the undervalued
sectors (Arnott et al, 2008), which is the
opposite of what a sector strategist would
want to do.
SECTOR CAPS
A promising middle ground strategy that does
not rely on sector forecasting models or upon
the passivity of assuming market efﬁciency lies
in applying sector weight limits or ‘caps’.
Writing in the May 2007 volume of the
Journal of Asset Management, authors Stanley G
Eakins and Stanley Stansell examined the
optimal portfolio strategy across 19 sector
funds for the December 1995–December
2002 period. Starting with an equal weighting
of 5.26 per cent in each sector, they analyzed
the returns that could be achieved by
rebalancing when any one sector grew to a
trigger threshold. By evaluating different
trigger points they determined that the
optimal portfolio returns were achieved when
the portfolio was rebalanced when any sector
grew to more than 9 per cent of the total
portfolio value. Higher returns were achieved
with a 10 per cent threshold, but with the cost
of a higher standard deviation. Nine per cent
had the highest Sharpe ratio. The authors’
straightforward conclusion was that consistent
rebalancing ‘reduced investor exposure to
sectors that have grown rapidly and may
experience reduced performance’.
We conducted a similar study using the
broader 10 MSCI Global Industrial
Classiﬁcation Standard sector codes over a
longer 20-year period.2 We sought to
improve upon the performance of the S&P
500 Index by utilizing monthly rebalancing to
maintain an upper capitalization on sector
allocation as a percentage of total portfolio
value. When sector weights exceeded the
Table 1: Investment performance across sector constraints
Description Returns








10% 7.3 17.2 42.5 48.8
15% 6.7 17.9 37.6 50.5
20% 6.4 18.1 35.4 51.4
25% 6.3 18.2 34.6 51.4
30% 6.2 18.2 34.0 51.4
S&P 500 6.20 18.30 33.90 51.40
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Table 2: Year-by-year results: 10 per cent strategy versus S&P 500 Index




















minus 10 per cent strategy
1989 2.0 8.7 22.98850575 7.1 2.0 8.7 22.98850575 7.1 0 0.0
1990 −2.7 15.9 −16.98113208 18.9 −3.1 16.1 −19.25465839 19.2 2.27352631 0.3
1991 29.0 14.1 205.67375890 12.9 30.5 14.3 213.28671330 14 −7.612954421 1.1
1992 7.9 9.5 83.15789474 5.5 7.6 9.7 78.35051546 5.6 4.807379273 0.1
1993 11.3 8.6 131.39534880 4.4 10.1 8.6 117.44186050 4.8 13.95348837 0.4
1994 2.2 9.8 22.44897959 8.6 1.3 9.8 13.26530612 8.5 9.183673469 −0.1
1995 37.8 7.6 497.36842110 2.4 37.6 7.8 482.05128210 2.6 15.317139 0.2
1996 21.1 11.3 186.72566370 7.4 23.0 11.8 194.91525420 7.4 −8.18959052 0.0
1997 31.8 16.9 188.16568050 9.9 33.4 18.1 184.53038670 10.8 3.635293733 0.9
1998 25.2 18.1 139.22651930 16.8 28.6 20.3 140.88669950 19.2 −1.66018017 2.4
1999 15.0 15.5 96.77419355 11.3 21.0 18.1 116.02209940 11.8 −19.2479059 0.5
2000 1.9 17.8 10.67415730 12.2 −9.1 22.2 −40.99099099 16.6 51.66514829 4.4
2001 −9.3 18.4 −50.54347826 23.9 −11.9 21.5 −55.34883721 35.7 4.805358948 11.8
2002 −20.3 25.1 −80.87649402 39.6 −22.1 26.0 −85.00000000 47.4 4.123505976 7.8
2003 27.2 16.1 168.94409940 36.5 28.7 17.1 167.83625730 45.4 1.107842069 8.9
2004 14.4 10.7 134.57943930 12.1 10.9 11.1 98.19819820 25.6 36.38124105 13.5
2005 6.1 10.5 58.09523810 6.8 4.9 10.3 47.57281553 19.5 10.52242256 12.7
2006 18.5 9.9 186.86868690 7.0 15.8 10.0 158.00000000 11.5 28.86868687 4.5
2007 9.9 15.7 63.05732484 9.3 5.5 16.0 34.37500000 9.9 28.68232484 0.6
2008 −35.1 40.2 −87.31343284 48.3 −37.0 41.0 −90.24390244 50.7 2.930469603 2.4




























threshold, the excess weight was allocated to
other sectors on a pro rata basis within the cap
limits. No assumptions were made for
transaction costs, taxes, management fees and
other frictional costs.
Our study looked at the period from
September 1989 to February 2009,
comprising 19 full calendar years. We looked
at maximum sector caps or ceilings between
10 and 30 per cent. The results, summarized
in Table 1 below, indicate that a 10 per cent
cut off or maximum sector weight produced
the best return/risk tradeoff, where return is
measured by absolute annual return and risk is
measured by the annualized standard
deviation of daily returns. Rebalancing
the S&P 500 Index on a monthly basis with a
10 per cent sector cap produced annual
returns in excess of 1.1 per cent over the S&P
500. The 10 per cent cut off also produced
the lowest maximum drawdown.
Looking at batting averages, the 10 per
cent cap with monthly rebalancing produced
a higher risk/return ratio in 14 years, or
73 per cent of the time over the 19 full-year
periods. It produced a lower maximum
drawdown in 18 years, or 95 per cent of the
time. These results are calculated from the
far-right columns of Table 2.
Using the 3-month US Treasury Bill for
calculating the Sharpe ratio, along with the
annualized standard deviation of daily returns
on a 3-year moving average basis, we also
found that the rebalanced S&P 500 Index
with a 10 per cent cap has a better Sharpe
ratio (Figure 1) and reduced volatility
(Figure 2) relative to the S&P 500.
Finally, Figure 3 indicates that the beneﬁts,
as measured by the return/risk proﬁle, of
placing a cap on sector weights makes sense
up to about 15 per cent, but beyond that the
gains from sector constraints are small.
CONCLUSION
Using data from September 1989 through
February 2009, we have shown that investors
may beneﬁt by imposing caps or maximums
on sector weights. Our study suggests that the
best results can be achieved when sectors are
rebalanced on a monthly basis whenever a
particular sector exceeds 10 per cent of the
value of the overall market. We feel that these
results suggest that sector limitations may help
investors mitigate the recurrent but
unpredictable sector collapses that
characterize the investment climate.3
NOTES
1. Conventional Wisdom refers to the upstream/downstream
sequence of materials outperforming coming out of a
cyclical trough, followed by industrials (manufacturing),
consumer durables consumption, etc., popularly
summarized in Stovall (1996).
2. The results of this study are based on various hypothetical
assumptions and historical data. Past performance is not
necessarily indicative of future results. The results of this
study are for general informational purposes and are in no
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Figure 3: Risk return proﬁle.
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South Texas Money Management’s actual investment
performance or investment practices.
3. Results of this study are provided for informational purposes
and do not constitute a solicitation or offer to subscribe for
or purchase any securities or investment services. Results of
this study are not intended to provide a sufﬁcient basis on
which to make an investment decision. Past performance
should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future
performance, and no representation or warranty, expressed
or implied is made regarding.
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